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The IATRC is a group of more than 80 economists interested in agricultural
trade, drawn from the academic community, government, and private institutions
in North America and seven other countries.  Founded in 1980, the Consortium has
the following objectives:
(1)  to facilitate and stimulate improvement in the quality and relevance  of
international agricultural trade research and policy analysis;
(2)  to facilitate collaborative research among its members;
(3)  to  facilitate  interaction  among  researchers  and  analysts  in  different
countries, universities, and governments engaged in and/or interested in
trade research;  and
(4)  to improve the general  understanding  of international  trade and trade
policy issues among the public at large.
In order to further these objectives, the Consortium established  three  task
force groups  early  in  1988  to  examine  the  issues  involved  in  dealing  with
agricultural trade problems through the current round of international negotiations
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI'). Funding for the three
groups was provided by the U.S. and Canadian governments.  Summaries of the
work and conclusions of the three task forces were presented at the Symposium
in Annapolis,  Maryland on August  19-20,  1988.  The  summaries  are titled as
follows:
(1)  Assessing the Benefits of Trade Liberalization
(2)  Designing Acceptable  Agricultural Policies
(3)  Negotiating a Framework  for Action.
The more detailed set of papers, upon which these summaries are based, will be
published in book form during  1989.
For further copies  of these  reports or  information  on the IATRC  and  its
activities, contact:
Professor David Blandford, Chairman




United States of America
Telephone:  607-255-8187NEGOTIATING  A FRAMEWORK  FOR ACTION
In September 1986, a new round of multilateral trade negotiations under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and trade (GATT) was launched in Punta del Este,
Uruguay. Agricultural  trade  is one of the major  items on the agenda.  As  the
Ministerial  Declaration  states,  they  are  to  "achieve  greater  liberalization  in
agriculture and bring all measures affecting import access and export competition
under strengthened and operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines". This
is to be achieved through among other things "the reduction of import barriers"
and by "increasing  discipline on the use of all direct and indirect subsidies and
other measures  affecting directly  or indirectly agricultural  trade,  including the
phased reduction of their negative effects and dealing with their causes."
The Uruguay Round is very different from previous negotiating rounds.  For
the first time,  the leaders  of the major  trading  nations  have  recognized  that
domestic policies are the fundamental  cause of agricultural trade problems.  To
solve these problems, the negotiations are to focus on a phased reduction oftrade-
distorting subsidies, improved market access, and the minimization of the adverse
trade effects of sanitary and phytosanitary regulations. Countries have also called
for a tightening of GATT rules and disciplines,  along with the  introduction  of
more workable dispute settlement procedures.
Since Punta del Este, agricultural trade has continued to be on the political
agenda.  The economic ministers  of the OECD countries,  in their May  1987
Communique, agreed on the objective  "to allow market signals to influence,  by
way  of a progressive  and  concerted reduction  of agricultural  support  ... the
orientation of agricultural production." The Communique recognizes the need to
take into account social and other concerns when modifying policies. Because the
reform  of policies  may take time, early action to reduce  market imbalances  is
desirable.  The  Communique  acknowledges  the  need  for  flexibility  in  how
countries meet their commitments under GAIT.  It proposes that farm income
support  be  provided  directly,  rather  than  through  price  guarantees  or  other
mechanisms that increase production.
The heads of state endorsed the OECD Communique at the Venice Economic
Summit  in June  1987  and affirmed  their commitment to  work "in  concert  to
achieve  the necessary adjustments  of agricultural  policies, both  at home and
through comprehensive negotiationsin the Uruguay Roundof GAIT  negotiations."
This decision was later reaffirmed at the Toronto Summit in June 1988, where the
participants  urged negotiators  in Geneva  to "develop  a framework approach"
including "short-term  options in line with long-term goals"  for the reduction of
trade-distorting measures.All these declarations fall short of specific commitments to change domestic
policies.  Indeed,  domestic policy  decisions  since  1986  have further  distorted
international  agricultural  markets.  For the most  part,  countries  agree  on  the
problem,  but differ on its solution.  Thus, there has been  little progress  in the
GATT on developing a framework  for negotiation for agriculture.
The Negotiating  Environment: Proposals and
Approaches
A number of proposals have been tabled by major GATT participants (see
table on following page). Though not specific negotiating plans, these proposals
provide some idea of the attitudes of countries  and the extent to which they are
prepared to subject their domestic policies to international scrutiny.  Theproposals
contain  common elements  upon which to build an acceptable framework;  they
also contain contradictions which have prevented a consensus from emerging.
Most  of the  proposals  suggest  a formula  or aggregate  approach  to  the
reduction of protection, not unlike that used for industrial products in previous
Rounds.  But this approach would focus on the overall trade-distorting support
provided by  governments  to their agricultural  sectors.  For  the  first time,  the
negotiations would encompass domestic policies as well as border measures. All
the proposals suggest the binding of commitments  in the GATI'.  Most suggest
binding quotas, subsidies, and subsidized quantities.  The Cairns Group proposal
(Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia,
Malaysia,  New Zealand, Philippines,  Thailand,  Uruguay)  goes  the  farthest by
suggesting along-term framework for agreement and the integration of agriculture
into the existing consultation,  surveillance, and dispute settlement provisions of
the GATT.  All  proposals  suggest strengthening and/or  altering  the rules  and
disciplines relating to subsidies and market access.
The  United  States  has  made  a  far-reaching  proposal  for  the  complete
elimination of "all policies which distort [agricultural]  trade" within a period of
10  years.  No short-term  measures are  suggested.  The European  Community
proposal, by contrast, emphasizes short-term measures, and is silent on both the
extent of the reduction  of support and its timetable.  Since its original proposal,
the Community  has clarified  its  position on  short-run  actions by calling  for a
freeze on subsidies, but has declined to be drawn on a specific timetable or target
for support reductions.  The U.S. position is to require an agreement on the target
for  reduction as a prerequisite for short-term measures. Atpresent, the negotiations
are stalled on this issue.
The  Cairns  Group  proposal  concurs  broadly  with  the  U.S.  objective  of
eliminating trade-distorting support, but argues for short-run actions to alleviateMain Elements of Negotiating Proposals for the Uruguay Round
United States:
* Eliminate all trade-distorting subsidies over a ten-year period
* Remove all barriers to market access over a similar period
* Monitor progress in liberalization with an aggregate measure of support such
as the PSE
European Community:
* Coordinate action to stabilize sugar, cereal, and dairy markets
* Cut significantly  the  levels of support over an agreed period  and achieve
better balance between commodities
* Use PSE-type measure  for monitoring,  but  adjust for  supply control  and
exchange rate variations
* Strengthen GATT rules to consolidate advances
Cairns Group:
* Freeze present subsidies  and other distoring measures
* Reduce levels of support over a ten-year period by an agreed amount
* Introduce new strengthened rules for agricultural trade in the period after the
phase-down of support
* Use PSE-type measure for monitoring progress
Canada:
* Elimination  of all trade-distorting  subsidies and barriers  to market access
over an agreed period
* Set interim target of, say, five years
* Use PSE-type measure  with credit for supply  control  and omitting  trade-
neutral policies (Trade Distortion Equivalent)
Nordic Countries:
* Take immediate measures  to prevent increases in excess supply
* Bind and reduce export subsidies
* Reduce barriers  to market access
* No PSE-type measure as qualified in the Canadian proposal
Japan:
* Freeze present export subsidies
* Phase out export subsidies over time
* Reduce trade-distorting impacts of domestic subsidies
* Negotiate improvements in market access
* No PSE-type measure needed for negotiationssurpluses and amendments  to GAIT rules.  Canada, which is a member of the
Cairns Group, has tabled a similar proposal, which advocates a five-year target  for
major reductions in trade-distorting support. More recently, the Cairns Group has
elaborated its suggestion for short-run action.  Countries would agree to a "down
payment" by introducing immediate policy reforms and indicate their "intent" by
reducing support in each of the next two years by  10 percent, as measured by
Producer  Subsidy  Equivalents  (PSEs).  The  Cairns  Group  suggests  that  the
timetable and extent of support cuts be agreed by the mid term review of the GATT
negotiations  in December 1988.
Exporting countries have been most concerned with deteriorating  prices in
international  markets and have been more extreme in their proposed  solutions.
Importing  countries,  although  recognizing  the  advantages  of a better  trading
environment, would like to place the burden of adjustment on exporting countries
(see box on following page).  Proposals by the Nordic countries (Finland, Iceland,
Norway, and  Sweden)  and Japan emphasize  the reduction  and elimination  of
export subsidies.  The Nordic countries would negotiate reduced levels of import
protection; Japan would negotiate improved rules for market access, if domestic
stability and food security were taken into account.
The motivation for many of these proposals is the high cost of government
support for agriculture.  The U.S. proposal reflects its domestic political interest
in reducing the federal deficit, as well as its faith in the efficiency of free markets.
The European Community shares the U.S. interest in expenditure reductions and
is therefore  willing to participate in multilateral  negotiations  on policy reform.
However,  if budgetary  costs  are  the  only  motivation,  countries  are  likely  to
continue to disagree on the necessary extent of trade liberalization.  There is also
disagreement on the extent to which prices should influence production decisions.
Countries  which are accustomed  to managing  domestic  markets  tend to prefer
negotiations on trade directly, rather than on the policy measures affecting trade.
The European Community, for example, leans  toward supply management and
market sharing. Finally, there remains disagreement over the causes of agricultural
trade problems.  Japan, for example, feels that these are due to subsidization by
exporters.
It is unclear how the negotiations will proceed.  The mid term review, to be
held in Montreal in December 1988, will assess progress and set the direction and
agenda for the future.  It will be an important landmark.  Success in the Uruguay
Round  hinges  on  the  political  will  to  follow  through  on  the  Punta  del  Este
Declaration  and  those  of the  subsequent  OECD  Ministerial  and  Economic
Summits.GATT AND THE DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
Since its beginning, the GATT  has offered developing  countries ample
latitude to exclude themselves from most GATT requirements.  By 1955 they
were permitted  to  impose quantitative  and other restrictions  on  imports to
protect infant industries or to remedy balance of payments  problems.  These
justifications have been interpreted so broadly that the GATT has  almost no
control over trade restrictions in developing countries.  Since 1971, developed
countries have been permitted to reduce barriers to developing country imports
below the level applied to other developed countries.  Each importer is allowed
to set quotas and to select the countries eligible for this preferential treatment.
The GATT also allows less direct forms of  separate treatment for developing
countries.  The exclusion of agriculture from most disciplines has especially
affected developing countries because agriculture often constitutes their largest
sector. In the Uruguay Round, the agricultural negotiations cover commodities
whose  exports  are  dominated  by developed  countries.  These  negotiations
exclude  tropical products whose exports come principally  from developing
countries.  Tropical products are being dealt with separately. The multifiber
agreement apparently leaves developing countries worse off than they would
be if fibers were treated like other commodities in the GATT.  Regardless of
whether the separate treatment of developing countries has benefited them, one
clear effect of limiting developing country responsibilities  in the GATT has
been to limit their influence in negotiations.
Some trade  liberalization  has recently  been  undertaken  by developing
countries  under  pressure  from  international  lending  institutions.  The
International Monetary Fund responded to the debt crisis of the early 1980's by
refinancing thedebtof developing countriesconditionalon structural adjustment.
The World Bank and major bilateral lenders have shifted from project-based
lending toward lending conditional on domestic policy liberalization.  Although
many  organizations  representing  developing  countries,  such  as  the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, continue to recommend  an
active role for government in both trade and domestic policy, some developing
country institutions are accepting the logic of more market-oriented policies.
For example, in July 1985 the Organization for African Unity acknowledged
"the primacy accorded the state has hindered rather than furthered  economic
development."Previous Approaches to Negotiations
Previous trade negotiations have employed one of three approaches, or some
combination. The traditional method is the request and offer approach.  Countries
identify the changes they desire in the trade barriers  of others and draw up a list
of their own barriers on which they are prepared to negotiate.  Dealing takes place
bilaterally, but the outcome is "multilateralized"  as a result of the GATT Most-
Favored-Nation principle. Under this principle, concessions made by one country
to  another  signatory  are  automatically  extended  to  other  signatories.  This
approach  works  best  for  negotiating  reductions  in  easily  identifiable  trade
barriers, such as quotas or tariffs. A second approach was introduced  during the
Kennedy Round of negotiations in the mid 1960s.  This entails agreement on an
across-the-board  cut in tariffs.  The depth of the cut is the focus of discussion,
but exceptions  can still be negotiated  through  the "request and offer" method.
These two approaches have been very successful in reducing tariff rates, but have
left non-tariff barriers relatively untouched.  A third method of negotiation, the
rules and obligations approach,  was used extensively during the Tokyo Round
during the 1970s to address non-tariff barriers.  It consists of negotiating codes of
behavior or conduct in order to strengthen GATr rules.
It  is  difficult  to  liberalize  agricultural  trade  by  using  these  negotiating
methods.  Agricultural  tariffs and quotas  have already  been  liberalized by  the
request and offer technique, and by across-the-board tariff cuts.  But tariffs, and
even quotas,  are  not the  major problem  for agricultural commodities.  These
techniques do not  touch the main instruments of agricultural protection, which are
domestic policies and non-tariff measures.  The closest the GATT has come to an
across-the-board  approach to agriculture  was in the Kennedy Round,  when the
European Community proposed a freeze on the margin  of support (montant de
soutien) provided by agricultural price policies.
Countries have had trouble writing GATT rules that are sufficiently strict to
constrain domestic policies.  The rules were originally drafted to avoid conflicts
with domestic policies.  Where such conflicts have arisen, exceptions  have been
made and the rules have been ignored.  The Section 22 waiver, obtained by the
United  States in  1955  to legitimize  the  use of import  quotas  for  agricultural
products, is an example of such an exception.
The Contracting Parties to the GATT have framed the current agricultural
negotiations very broadly. They include all domestic policies that distort trade.
They are not be limited to the traditional targets of negotiation--tariffs and import
quotas. The request and offer approach is less practical under these circumstances
because of the enormous number of policy instruments used to protect agriculture.
Furthermore, it may not be possible to negotiate agreements on new rules, unless
allowance is made for a gradual and balanced elimination of the trade distortionsarising from the exceptions, omissions, and special treatment accorded agriculture
under  existing rules.  As  a result, a  comprehensive  negotiating  framework  is
required.  This framework  should cover  all  agricultural policies which  distort
trade.  It would use elements of  previous negotiating approaches where necessary,
as well as introduce new ones.
A Comprehensive  Negotiating Framework
The  agricultural  framework  must allow individual countries  to  negotiate
changes  in  domestic  policies  which  satisfy  their  own  economic  and  social
objectives, yet be consistent with the objectives of the Uruguay Round.  Such a
framework should be based on the following principles:
*  The objectives of the negotiations are to freeze, gradually reduce, and finally
eliminate the trade-distorting effects of agricultural policies.
*  While  countries  remain  free  to  choose  their  own  agricultural  policies,
governments should reach an early agreement on those policies which have a
minimal impact on trade, and are deemed acceptable.
*  Reform of agricultural policies in developing countries should be included in
the negotiations, but an agreement on agricultural policy reform needs to take
into account their level of economic development
*  All policies that distort agricultural trade should be subject  to clear, precise,
and enforceable GATI  rules and disciplines.  These rules should be broadly
consistent with those for other traded products.
A comprehensive negotiating framework which embraces  these principles is
outlined below. The framework consists of  a  set of parallel negotiating approaches
and a timetable for the phased implementation of outcomes.  The framework  has
three essential elements (see table on next page). First, it includes an across-the-
board negotiating technique based on an Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS)
and Country Plans for reducing trade-distorting assistance.  Second, it allows for
the negotiation and progressive  implementation of more effective GATT rules
and disciplines.  Third, it allows for the adoption of ad hoc agreements which
are commodity and/or policy specific. The three approaches would lead to actions
and commitments to be undertaken in the short, medium, and long term.
The AMS Approach:  This consists ofa  phased reduction in the level of trade-
distorting government support over an agreed time period.  Progress toward
meeting  an  AMS  target  would be  reviewed periodically.  Countries  would
submit  Country  Plans  indicating  how  they  intend  to  achieve  their  AMS
reductions.  The Country Plans would be bound in GATTI  and would be subject
to  revision if  targets were not met. Rules for implementation would be included
in the overall agreement to reduce trade-distorting  support.~.  0
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aGATT  Rules Approach:  The AMS  approach  would be complemented by
applying GATT rules and disciplines progressively to agriculture. In the short
term, renewed attention would be given to implementing existing rules  and
disciplines effectively.  A freeze would be imposed on the use of sanitary and
phytosanitary regulations as trade barriers.  In the medium term, stronger rules
would  be negotiated.  After  a period  of adjustment all  remaining forms  of
protection and trade-distorting subsidies wouldbe bound in GATT. In the long
term,  the  removal  of  all  exceptional  treatment  for  agriculture  would  be
negotiated.  Effective  permanent  rules  and  dispute  settlement  procedures
would be put in place.  Sanitary and phytosanitary regulations affecting  trade
would also be harmonized.
Ad Hoc Measures: Because the AMS approach and the use of GATTrules do
not cover all the issues, there is a need for flexibility on  an ad hoc basis.  Ad
hoc measures  would complement  or replace  aspects of the  AMS  and rules
approaches  where  necessary.  Short-term  ad  hoc measures  could  include
enforcing existing standstill provisions, freezing the use of export subsidies,
and procedures  for the orderly release of stocks.  Medium-term options could
include providing minimum levels  of market access, or commodity or policy
agreements.  These measures would be linked  to simultaneous reductions  in
assistance or improvements  in market access.
Policy Coverage
The  proposals  tabled  in  GATT  suggest  that  policies  having  a  low  or
insignificant trade-distorting effect should be excluded from the negotiations. All
policies, however, are likely to have some effect on trade.  Whether or not this
trade  "effect"  is  also a trade  "distortion"  depends on  the  perspective  of each
participant, and is therefore negotiable.  In order to draw up a basic list of policies
causing the most trade distortion, it is useful to distinguish between policies which
have a direct short-run impact on farmer net returns and those which do not. The
first category  includes  border  measures,  domestic  price/income  supports  and
most forms of input/marketing  subsidies.  These policies can cause  significant
trade distortions.  They  should therefore  be included in the  basic list of trade-
distorting  policies.  Under  the  Comprehensive  Framework,  they  would  be
"Policies Subject to Negotiation" (see table on next page) they would be included
in the AMS, and they would be subject to AMS reductions.  The only exceptions
are sanitary and phytosanitary regulations for which an AMS is difficult to define
and which would be handled under a rules "only"  approach.
Included  in the basic list are  a few policies---decoupled  payments  and price/
income stabilization programs-whose treatment would be conditional on GATT
rules.  The  rules would  identify  conditions under  which  these policies  cause
minimal trade distortions. Policies which meet the conditions would be excludedPolicy Coverage  under a Comprehensive Framework-An Illustrative List
Policies  Subject to Negotiation
(Basic  List)
Comprehensive  Approach









Voluntary  restraint agreements
Other trade restrictions
II.  Direct Income  Supports:
Direct payments  (tied to production)
III.  Input  Subsidies:
Fuel, fertilizer, seed, pesticide, irrigation,
feed,  concessionary interest rates
IV.  Market Subsidies:





(May be  Subject to Negotiation)





II.  Conservation/Environmental  Programs
III.  Development  Assistance/Food  Aid
IV.  Disaster Relief/Crop  Insurance
V.  LDC  Countries/Policies  Receiving
Special/Differential  Treatment
Comprehensive  Approach
Conditional  on Rules
Price/Income  Stabilization  Programs
Decoupled  Direct Payments  Including  PEG
Payments
Rules Only Approach
I.  Sanitary/Phytosanitary  Regulations
from the AMS.  Policies which fail to meet the conditions would be included in
the AMS and would be subject to AMS reductions.  The rules may be interim or
permanent  in  nature.  For example, Producer  Entitlement Guarantees  (PEGs)
might  be  allowed  as  a  form  of  decoupled  payment  (see  the  IATRC  report:
"Designing Acceptable Agricultural Policies").  Permanent rules might define the
type of decoupled payments allowable under GATI and the terms under which
price/income  stabilization  programs  can operate.  The latter should operate  as
"safety nets", but provide no long-run support to farmers.
The second category of policies includes infrastructural development,research
and extension,  inspection services, and conservation programs.  These normally
involve objectives  other than supporting  farm incomes,  for example, economic
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food safety. Farm income support arising from these programs does not normally
depend on the current level of production or prices.  These policies would not be
included in the basic list for negotiation, but they could be handled on an ad hoc
basis during  negotiations  over  Country Plans.  As  in  the case of conditional
policies in the basic list, rules may be needed for the operation of these policies.
For example, food aid would be allowed and thus excluded from the AMS, only
if it is not tied to commercial sales.
Policies which are excluded from the AMS present potential loopholes which
could be used by countries  in providing trade-distorting  support  to their farm
sectors. Thus, the AMS for such policies would be"monitored" during the course
of the Uruguay  Round.  They could  be added  to the  negotiating  list of future
rounds. Other policies, such as tax and exchange rate policies, could also be added
to this list.
Special consideration for developing countries could be given in assigning
policies to the "monitored"  category.  Where a government activity is shown to
offset market failures in a particular developing country, it could be "monitored"
rather  than  included  in  the AMS.  By  allowing  latitude  in  the  treatment  of
developing  countries,  the GATT  would recognize  their  special  needs  without
releasing them from the discipline of GATT rules.
Accounting for Trade Distortions
Except for Japan, countries have accepted the use of a quantitative measure
of agricultural support such as the Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE). Canada,
supported by the Nordics, suggests that the PSE should be modified to reflect the
trade distortions resulting from agricultural support.  The European Community
and the Nordics suggest that adjustments need to be made for production controls
and for world price and currency fluctuations.
The PSE is defined by OECD as the payment needed to compensate farmers
for the loss of income resulting from the removal of a given policy measure.  It
captures  the  effects of policies  through  an  index which  roughly reflects  their
potential trade distortions.  It does not indicate the actual level of distortion. This
depends on country size, and producer and consumer response to price changes.
Despite its limitations, the PSE is a useful measure for the policies included
under the basic trade-distorting list.  The trade effects of these policies are for the
most part correlated  with the size of the PSE.  Exceptions  are:  1) policies that
directly  affect  production  but not  consumption,  2) policies  where  producer
support is limited by supply controls, and 3) decoupled direct payments and price/
income  stabilization  programs.  The last group  was  discussed  earlier.  These
policies  would  be  excluded  from  the  PSE  if  they  meet  specific  conditions.
Otherwise, they would be included and treated just like any other form of price and
income support.
11Direct payments,  which are tied  to production,  and input subsidies  affect
output directly but have no immediate impact on consumers.  Policies that raise
market prices, on the other hand, increase production and lower consumption.  The
latter are more trade distorting than direct payments or input subsidies. This gives
rise to two problems.  First, countries could cut their overall PSE but shift support
to more trade-distorting policies. Since these policies all involve border measures,
however,  such an option  would be precluded by  a standstill agreement which
freezes all forms of border support.  Second, countries would not necessarily be
required to cut their most trade-distorting policies when reducing their PSE. This
could be handled by a rule which  states that border measures must be reduced
before other forms of support, or resolved in ad hoc negotiations of Country Plans.
Accounting  for  the  trade  distortions  arising  from  programs  involving
production and/or input controls creates  greater difficulties.  These controls can
limit the trade-distorting effect of  producer support. If credits are given for supply
controls, rules will be required to determine when such controls effectively reduce
output.  Furthermore, if credits are to be given for existing controls, countries are
likely to argue that they should also be given for future supply limitations.  In
effect, countries would be allowed to cut their PSE either by lowering the support
level per ton or by cutting back the tonnage receiving support.
The use of the aggregate value of support as the AMS deals with the problem
of supply  controls.  This  is  calculated  by  multiplying  the  per-unit  PSE  by
production.  The measure automatically gives "credit" for controlling production.
Countries using supply controls could use it as their AMS.  Using the total value
of support as the AMS, however,  increases the options available to countries to
reduce support, and may require additional rules on how this may be achieved.
Such rules would ensure that a country's supply controls would have beneficial
trade effects.  For example, a country that chooses to reduce support by reducing
production could also be required to reduce its exports and/or expand its imports.
Or it could be required to implement a PEG system.  A country that chooses to
reduce support and relax production controls, on theother hand, mightbe required
to  maintain  imports/exports  at their  current  share  of domestic  production  or
perhaps  increase/decrease  the  share  of  imports/exports  relative  to  domestic
production.
Short-Term  Actions
The objectives of short-term  actions (see table on next page) should be:
*  to strengthen the standstill/freeze provisions of the Punta del Este declaration;





























0*  to obtain a firm commitment of the good intentions of participants through a
"down payment" of immediate policy reforms.
Short-term has two meanings in this context: the negotiations are to take place
early in the Round, and they will result in actions before completion of the Round.
Negotiation on short-term actions should be conducted simultaneously with those
on long-term reform.  Moreover, short-term actions must be consistent with those
over the medium term and with long-run reform of the GATT Articles.
Standstill, Early  Relief and Commitment
The standstill provisions of  the Punta del Este Declaration commit nations not
to take any restrictive or distorting action that is inconsistent with GATT, nor any
action that  is  consistent with  GATT beyond that  needed  to "remedy  specific
situations." Nations are also committed not to take any actionthat would improve
their negotiating position.  A number of countries have brought actions under the
GATT alleging violations of the standstill agreement. This is evidence of the need
for a more explicit agreement.
Early relief proposals  reflect the concern  of nations with the  deteriorating
trade environment and the large expenditures  on agriculture.  Proposals call  for
actions to bring supply in line with effective demand. The urgency for early relief
has been reduced by the strengthening of dairy product, oilseed, and cereal prices
in 1988.  This illustrates that the GATT is not an appropriate forum for deciding
measures of such short-term nature,  except as part of a program  for long-term
reform. Therefore,  negotiations on short-term  actions  should be preceded  by a
strengthening of the standstill provisions that served as a basis for initiating the
Round.
Proposals call for a firm commitment to good intentions through immediate
policy  reforms.  These  would  be taken  in  addition  to  any unilateral  reforms
implemented prior to the  start of the negotiations.  Credit for unilateral reform
would be deferred  to the negotiations on medium-term  plans of action.
Issues and Options
The United States has not proposed strengthening the standstill provisions or
providing early relief for depressed conditions in international commodity markets.
An agreement early in the Round to eliminate subsidies in ten years is viewed by
the United States to be evidence of good intentions and to provide the necessary
down  payment.  The  European  Community  proposes  immediate  actions  to
stabilize international commodity markets, but like the United States does not call
fora strengthening of the standstill agreement. It does not call for a down payment
but believes significant credit should be given for its unilateral policy reforms.
A  freeze  or  standstill  could  be  accomplished  by  binding  the  AMS,  as
suggested  in the Nordic  Proposal.  However,  the  difficulties  in defining  and
14implementing an AMS suggest that an ad hoc approach should be used to define
explicitly  the freeze  and  standstill.  The Nordic  and Cairns  Group  proposals
provide several options that could be pursued in ad hoc negotiations.  Participants
could  agree  to  freeze  trade-distorting  subsidies,  the  level  of  government
expenditures,  import barriers, and the trade effects of supply control programs.
These  agreements  should  be  made  within  the context of transition  rules  for
implementing  Country Plans and agreements  on long-run  reductions in  trade-
distorting policies.
The freeze and standstill agreement should be followed by ad hoc negotiations
to address major concerns over imbalances  in international commodity markets.
These negotiations could seek to implement some of the provisions of the Cairns
Group and the E.C. proposals.  Agreements for the responsible and non-disruptive
disposal  of stocks and disciplines  in international  marketing could be reached
within  the context  of the transition  rules  to guide  the  implementation  of  the
Country Plans.  A commitment of good intentions should be obtained through an
agreement to a substantial medium-term  reduction  in the AMS  in each  country
over a specific time period, and also a down payment of policy reforms. The latter
would be achieved through an immediate  10 percent reduction in each nation's
AMS. As mentioned earlier, the issue of credits would be deferred to negotiations
on medium-term reform. Special consideration should be given to requests from
developing  countries  that  choose  to participate  by  submitting  a package  of
reductions.
Medium-Term  Actions
Short-term actions emphasize the  relief of immediate pressures on international
markets  and the  demonstration  of an "earnest  of intent"  for  more permanent
action. The long-term goal should be a  more liberal trading system for agricultural
products, coupled with better-targeted and less trade-disruptive domestic policies.
Medium-term actions address the question of "how to get there from here". This
is the main topic of the proposals before the GATT.  With the exception of the
Nordic and Japanese proposals, which  down play the notion of domestic policy
change,  there is general agreement that a monitored, progressive reduction in the
level of trade-distorting policies is necessary.  It is both likely and desirable that
this will be accompanied by a set of rules aimed specifically at a transition  to a
better trading system.  There will be other negotiating  issues that do not fall into
either the category of "rules" or "measured reduction." These ad hoc actions can
complement the other approaches, and will have to take more of the burden if the
discussions falter. These three elements (see table on page 6) of the medium-term






























YA Target  for Support Reduction
A phased reduction  in support,  or the "AMS"  approach,  would bring new
possibilities and challenges to the negotiating  system.  An aggregate approach
offers  a way around many of the problems that have hindered agricultural trade
talks in the past.  It provides a visible target which can be agreed  in advance of
detailed commodity/policy discussions. It expands the coverage of the negotiations
to  all  domestic  policies  that distort  trade  without  mandating  specific  policy
changes, but provides a framework for the progressive improvement of domestic
policies. The policy  coverage of the AMS  encourages  the switching of policy
instruments to trade-neutral forms.
How the AMS is to be used in the negotiations depends on the willingness of
governments to enter into commitments which limitdomestic policies. Uncertainty
as to whether the aggregate measure approach can really change what governments
do  domestically  has led some  to  argue  that the  AMS  should be  limited  to a
monitoring role. However, a major advantage of the aggregate approach is that it
provides an overall target for reducing trade-distorting support. How the target is
expressed  is  itself  a  significant  part  of  the  negotiating  process.  Expressing
commitments  in terms of such a target would  still leave room  for subsequent
discussions of individual policies.
Negotiations to implement the AMS approach would include two elements.
First, countries would agree to set a ceiling on their AMS and then to reduce this
by a given amount.  The reduction in support would be 50 percent over a period
of five years and would apply across-the-board to all commodities. It would be
achieved in equal annual increments  of 10 percent.  The per-unit PSE would be
used  as  the  AMS  unless  supply  control  credits  are  given,  in  which  case an
aggregate value PSE would be used as the AMS. The ceiling would be relatively
easy to implement since most trade-distorting  support would already be frozen
under the standstill agreement.
Second,  countries  would  submit plans for changes  in domestic  and trade
policies to reduce their AMS.  These Country Plans would be evaluated against
the  agreed reduction in the AMS.  They would also be bound in GATT in the
important  sense  that  deviations  which  hurt  trading  partners  would  trigger
compensation.  The exact mechanism used to reduce support would be up to the
country concerned, subject to agreed implementation rules; thus domestic political
processes would be constrained but not overridden.
Implementation  rules  would guide  the AMS  approach.  The rules would
cover such issues as policy and commodity coverage,  the use of the aggregate
measure, the base period, and the depth and pace of reductions.  The rules would
establish  when certain policies  have minimal effects  on  trade and can thus be
excluded  from  the  AMS.  They  could  also ensure  that the methods  used  by
countries  to reduce agricultural  support have beneficial  trade effects.  Some of
17these issues have already been discussed in the context of "Policy Coverage" and
"Accounting for Trade Distortions" under the Comprehensive Framework. Other
issues  which arise  under  the AMS  approach  are  highlighted  by  country  case
studies (see Box on next page).
The  implementation  phase  for  reductions  in  agricultural  support  would
involve an interim review and a final review.  In each, a country will have met its
GATT  commitments  if it has both  implemented  its Country Plan  and  has  not
allowed its AMS to rise. No changes  in Country Plans would be required until
these reviews. Thus domestic support prices in many countries would be insulated
from fluctuations in world prices and exchange rates. At the interim review, the
AMS  for each  country  would  be recalculated  using the  most recent data  on
exchange rates, world prices and production.  Where the calculated AMS has not
reached the agreed target, a country would be required to adjust its Country Plan
in order  to  meet its  target by  the end of period.  This  would require  greater
reductions in  support prices and other  instruments  than  were proposed  in  the
original Country Plan.  When  the calculated AMS  has  overshot  the target, the
Country Plan  could also be  adjusted  accordingly.  This could  occur if world
market prices rise as the result of the world-wide reduction in agricultural support.
In this instance, less of a cut in support prices and other instruments would be
required. The final review would be conducted on the same basis as the interim
review.  The AMS  for each country  would be recalculated  and Country Plans
would be adjusted accordingly.  Meanwhile, new negotiations would begin with
a view to completing the process of bringing agricultural trade into full conformity
with GATI obligations.
Interim GATT Rules
Over  the medium-term  plan  of action  the  role of interim  rules  would be
twofold.  They would underpin the changes in policy that would accompany the
reduction in support, and they would lead to the establishment of permanent rules
for the conduct of agricultural trade.  Interim rules would be based on existing
GATT  Articles  and  in  many  cases  represent  the  strengthening  of codes  and
procedures  already in operation.
It is assumed that the negotiators will agree from the outset that all national
measures that distort trade should be placed on the table.  There should also be
agreement that all measures that adversely affect trade should be subject to precise
and enforceable GATTF rules and disciplines.  In the adjustment period, the rules
are likely tobe transitional, although it ispossible that some permanentrules could
be agreed from the outset.  These interim rules would complement and reinforce
the process  of a progressive  reduction  in aggregate support.  If the process  of
reduction  is not sustained,  the stronger rules would be preserved  to discipline
agricultural trade.
18REDUCING  THE LEVEL OF TRADE-DISTORTING  SUPPORT
What are the options available to countries for achieving a 50 percent reduction in support?
Our focus  is  on  reducing  the trade-distorting  element  of PSEs  for grains,  dairy,  sugar  and
livestock products.  The following issues  are important:
(1)  Price and income policies provide most of the support in most countries.  Input subsidies
are less important.
(2)  In some cases,  PSEs could be reduced by lowering domestic administered prices with no
change in border measures; and consequently,  with no change in trade.
(3)  Most developing  countries have negative PSEs  for some crops  and policies,  and many
have negative  aggregate PSEs.  Distorted exchange rates,  state trading  and export taxes
are major causes of negative PSEs.  If the negative components  are retained in the AMS,
developing countries could maintain or  increase the support provided by some policies by
using negative  offsets  from others.  Requiring reductions  in negative  PSE components
implies  elimination  of consumer  subsidies  and  export taxes.  These  taxes are  a major
source of revenue in some developing  countries.
(4)  Significant support comes from programs administered by regional authorities in Canada,
Australia,  and many  developing countries.  Federal  authorities  may  find  it difficult  to
modify these programs.
(5)  The size of required  reductions is sensitive to the base year chosen and the type of PSE
measure  (per unit versus  total transfers).
(6)  The farm sector is often a dominant source of employment and income than in developing
countries.  It may be necessary to provide offsets, such as improved access  to markets  for
nonfarm and tropical products, for these countries.
Some country implications are:
Japan.  About 60 percent of support to agriculture  goes  to rice producers.  A 50 percent
cut in support would require fundamental changes  in rice policy.
Australia.  The aggregate PSE is low (12 percent) but uneven across commodities.  High
tariffs on manufacturing inputs act as a tax on agricultural producers and are not captured in PSEs.
European Community.  Most  support  comes from  price  and income  support policies.
Using a constant base for world prices in the calculation,  PSEs have  declined  significantly in
recent years.  The Community could  argue for a sizable credit  in any  agreement to reduce the
overall  level  of support.  The  size of the  credit would  depend  on  the base  year chosen,  the
specification of the PSE (per unit vs. total transfers),  and the support-cutting  formula used.
United States.  Could  reduce its aggregate  PSE for grains by half without changing the
Export Enhancement program.  Deficiency payments must be reduced  significantly to lower the
grains'  PSE, implying lower target prices.  The interaction of other program instruments on the
size of deficiency payments suggests  that a "target"  level of price reduction may be difficult to
identify.  Acreage reduction provisions may prove  as important as target prices  since these less
stringent acreage reductions generally lead to higher program participation and higher deficiency
payments.  Lower dairy and sugar PSEs will require  reduced domestic price support and relaxed
border measures.
Canada. The PSE may overstate the trade-distorting effect of the dairy program, Western
Grain Stabilization  scheme and deficiency  payment programs for grains  and oilseeds.  Options
that potentially yield lower dairy PSEs but do not provide increased market access  include lower
direct payments,  lower  fluid milk  premium  and/or expand  production  quota  while  keeping
border measures in place.  Removing the  Crow rate  transportation  subsidy would not result in
a 50 percent reduction in PSEs for grains and oilseeds.
Developing  countries.  Thailand (rice) and Nigeria have  shifted from negative to zero or
positive PSEs in recent years, and other developing country PSEs were volatile, illustrating the
importance  of the base  period  choice.  Thailand and Pakistan normally  tax exports  and, by
adjusting the tax on some or all crops, could offset support through infrastructure, input and credit
subsidies.  In Brazil, the negative effects of producer taxes and overvalued exchange  rates are
more than offset by large credit subsidies  for many products.  Egypt provides large consumer
subsidies  through  border  and price policies  that also tax producers.  In Mexico,  reduction  in
producer price and input subsidies  would likely lead to govemment budget savings,  but would
also lead to higher input costs and  shift the burden of support from taxpayers to consumers.
19A preparatory document by the GATT Committee on Trade in Agriculture
contains many suggestions that may be useful in developing  interim rules.  The
prohibition on the use of quantitative restrictions (QRs) could be revised gradually
to include all QRs that currently escape its disciplines such as waivers, grandfather
clauses, protocols of accession and residual QRs.  In addition, border restriction
such as variable levies,  minimum import price regimes, and voluntary  restraint
agreements could be brought under the disciplines  of Article XI.
Where quantitative restrictions remain, there should not only be a minimum
level of guaranteed access, linked to effective production controls, but this should
be  accompanied  by  commitments  to  narrow  the  gap progressively  between
domestic and world prices. Article XVI should be revised with a view towards
gradually phasing  down and eventually  eliminating  direct  export subsidies  or
other subsidies with similar effects. The requirements with respect to transparency
of state trading operations should also be strengthened. The interim rules would
be designed  to guide  the process  of  adjustment in  a progressive  and  orderly
manner.  They should be written in clear, precise, and enforceable language.
The monitoring and dispute settlement procedures should be strengthened to
ensure  the  implementation  of  revised  rules  governing  trade  in  agricultural
products. Supplementary procedures  may be required for dealing with the AMS
approach.  This approach  puts a burden on  the negotiating process, in that new
ways will have to be explored for expressing commitments, defining obligations,
and  resolving  disputes.  It  will  be  necessary  to  develop  unique,  effective
arrangements for the surveillance of the implementation of undertakings  which
involve  a  schedule of specific  policy  changes.  It  is likely  that commitments
relating  to internal policies  will differ from  traditional  GATT  undertakings  in
terms of their form, precision, and contractual nature.  Governments will wish to
retain flexibility  to adjust domestic programs  in response to changes in  market
conditions, exchange  rates, and other unexpected developments.
The institutions of GATT should also be strengthened to oversee the process
of progressive reduction in aggregate support and  the effective application  and
enforcement of rules  and dispute settlement procedures. A strengthening of the
Secretariat  would  be  required  to  deal  with  these  expanded  commitments.
Consideration should be given to the establishment of a senior policy  group in
GATT  to  carry  out  surveillance,  and  possibly  to  negotiate  adjustments  in
commitments and settle disputes.  The GATT  should be given more authority to
review  national  policies  affecting  agricultural  trade.  This  may  be  the  most
appropriate way to oversee the progressive reduction of import barriers and trade-
distorting subsidies.  Such a policy group might be empowered to settle disputes
but, if not, the Contracting Parties would have access to the regular procedures of
GATT.
20Ad Hoc  Measures
Not all medium-term measures will fall conveniently under the headings of
interim rule reinforcement or measured support reduction.  There are two reasons
why other, ad hoc, elements might be necessary.  First, the reduction in protection
envisaged under the AMS  approach may not address specific  trade concerns of
particular countries.  Whereas a 100% reduction in trade-distorting support would
meet all  such concerns,  a  50%  reduction  would  probably  not.  Although  the
implementation rules should be able to handle any problems, countries may wish
to have a list of ad hoc requests to put on the negotiating table over and above (or
as a specific part of) the overall support reduction.
A second reason has to do with the treatment of supply control under an AMS
approach.  Removing  supply controls  should be a long-range  goal  for policy
reform. Quantitative restrictions are a symptom of unbalanced markets and create
their own distortions  in production.  However,  the relaxation  of a production
quota, even if accompanied by a fall in support prices, could still contract imports
or  increase  exports.  Exporting  countries  hoping  for  trade  benefits  from  the
negotiations might feel that such apparent reductions in aggregate support were
less than desirable.  Again, the implementation  rules may be able to handle this
problem.  If not, ad hoc procedures could be used to ensure that AMS reductions
meet broad objectives  in terms of reducing trade distortions.
A further rationale can be advanced  for supplementing  the AMS approach
with ad hoc actions.  The AMS  approach,  even if backed  up by rule changes,
depends on high-level political commitment and sustained domestic support.  By
contrast,  the more traditional  request and offer approach  requires  no  specific
statement of outcome and often takes place away from the domestic spotlight.  If
the initial commitment to wide-ranging support reduction were to waver, it would
be useful to have commodity-specific  and policy-specific proposals  to fall back
on, rather than risk the total collapse of the agricultural part of the Uruguay Round.
Ad hoc negotiations, within the framework of other medium-term actions, could
have a positive role to play.
The  "Country  Plans"  may  be a  useful  vehicle  for  incorporating  ad  hoc
concerns in a way that supplements the AMS approach.  Each Country Plan could
give an  opportunity for  other trading  partners  to request  that particular  trade
problems be addressed. The Country Plans could be a vehicle for making explicit
the relationship between the relaxation  of supply controls and improved market
access.  "Credit" for actions which have a particularly beneficial impact on trade
might be subsumed more easily under a Country Plan than built explicitly into an
aggregate measure.  Bindings of subsidy levels and plans for a rollback, together
with explicit guarantees  of market access, could  also  be incorporated  into the
Plans. Finally, the Country Plan could lead to greater transparency in identifying
trade issues even if the AMS reduction  should fail for some reason.  The set of
plans could then form the basis for another type of negotiation.
21Long-Term  Actions
The objectives of the Uruguay Round negotiations on agriculture for the long
term (see table on next page)  are to:
*  complete the process of  reductions in barriers to trade and the removal of trade-
distorting subsidies;
*  encourage  adjustment  in domestic  farm programs  to remove  or limit their
adverse effects  on trade;
*  implement and maintain on open trading system  for agriculture,  based on a
permanent framework of clear and enforceable  GATT rules  and disciplines.
These objectives should be achieved by extending the process of reductions
in the AMS  in each country, and by securing  this progress  through changes in
national farm and trade policies. It would be supplemented by the implementation
of a permanent framework  of international rules and disciplines.  This process
should  be  supported  by  procedures  for policy  review,  surveillance,  and  the
settlement of disputes.  There is also scope to facilitate and reinforce agricultural
trade liberalization through ad hoc actions to achieve better coordination  of the
economic policies which affect agricultural production and trade.
The Importance  of Contractual  Rules
The process of bringing agriculture into the GATT will rely increasingly on
the  negotiation  of clear  and enforceable  rules  and disciplines.  This  must be
achieved  through  amending  or  rewriting  GATT  Articles,  codes,  interpretive
notes, and negotiating supplementary  provisions.  The weakness  in of current
rules stems primarily from the unwillingness of governments to accept disciplines
on  their  domestic  farm  programs.  The  world  agricultural  trade  crisis  has
weakened  the  credibility  and  authority  of GATT.  It is  crucial  that  rules  and
disciplines be strengthened if confidence in the international trading system is to
be restored.  Consequently,  the objectives of rules  in both the medium  and  the
longer  term  are  to remove  progressively  the  exceptional  treatment  accorded
agriculture, and to negotiate a permanent framework for the conduct of trade in all
goods, including agriculture.
Although the Uruguay Round proposals generally  support stronger GATT
rules, governments  may  be unwilling  to agree that these  should apply  fully to
agriculture following the completion of the medium-term  actions.  Although it is
possible  that some  permanent  rules,  such  as  a  prohibition  on  direct  export
subsidies, could  be agreed and implemented  at the beginning  of the transition
period, a general prohibition on the use of the quantitative restrictions or domestic
subsidies which affect trade may not  be fully attainable in the medium term. Thus,
interim rules should be designed to bring trade progressively under GATT and












































'SIt  is also important to develop rules in clear and unambiguous terms to reduce
the scope for policy  differences  and to enable the dispute settlement process  to
function  effectively.  In this respect, it is likely that governments  will insist on
greater flexibility  in writing rules  and conditions relating  to domestic  policies.
Traditionally,  governments  have been  reluctant  to accept  disciplines  on  their
internal agricultural policies.  Despite their declared willingness in the Punta del
Este Declaration  to negotiate on the trade effects of current policies, and to deal
with their causes, it remains to be seen whether firm commitments in the form of
contractual rules and disciplines will be agreed.  This underscores the importance
of negotiating strong and enforceable  rules and disciplines  which deal with the
trade-distorting effects of policies, and of implementing a permanent framework
of rules in parallel  with the AMS approach.
Completing the Program  of Reductions
Government  commitments  to  reduce  trade  barriers  and  trade-distorting
subsidies should be continued throughout the 1990s and possibly beyond.  There
should be an agreement to review the program of adjustments at regular intervals.
Governments should negotiate additional reductions to levels comparable to those
for  other  traded  goods.  To  the  extent  that  developing  countries  have  not
participated in the AMS program of reductions, arrangements will be required to
cover their policies and interests.
Although the objective of the negotiations may be the removal of all policy
instruments with significant adverse effects on agricultural trade, it is difficult to
determine  in advance how far the process  will go. It may be altered or fail to be
completed.  In any case,  there should  be agreement to bind all forms  of trade
protection  and trade-distorting  instruments  against  any  adjustments  that may
harm  the interests  of  other  Contracting  Parties.  This  would  provide  strong
security  for the reductions  negotiated  in  each  Round and  should prevent  the
erosion of the progress achieved through the AMS approach.
The results of the Uruguay Round would be greatly enhanced if governments
would  agree  to  translate  into  tariff-equivalent  forms  and  bind  in  all  trade-
distorting support  that remains  after the first phase of adjustment.  This would
provide a firm  basis for subsequent  negotiations  on reductions  in barriers and
improvements in the rules and operations of GATT.
Trade-Neutral  Policies
Governments  must reach  agreement  on  which  policies  seriously  distort
agricultural trade and begin to alter or remove these policies.  The process of re-
instrumentation will take place gradually.  It is unlikely that countries will adopt
a common approach due to differences  in existing policies, in country conditions,
and in policy preferences.  The process of negotiating  new  commitments  and
24tabling Country Plans with agreed implementation  rules could continue into the
long term. Governments may then agree to a  code with respect to development and
operation  of  national  policies  to ensure  their  trade-neutrality  and  to  provide
mechanisms  for on-going policy notification, monitoring and consultations.
Although interim rules are designed to bring agriculture fully under GATT,
the medium-term process is likely to stop short of free trade.  For example, the
policies now covered by waivers, grandfather clauses and protocols of accession
to  the  GATT  are  likely  to require  an  extended  period  of transition  even  if
governments agree to accept that there will be full disciplines for them eventually.
Policies now  operating outside GATT rules, such as  variable levies, voluntary
restraint  agreements  and  aspects  of state  trading  operations,  should  also  be
brought  under  the  rules.  This  will  involve  changes  in  many  basic  policy
instruments.  An agreement to convert all remaining trade barriers to their tariff-
equivalents and to prohibit all direct and indirect subsidies  would represent a
major advance in the process of trade liberalization for agriculture.
Maintaining an  Open Trading System
The  AMS  approach  envisages  the negotiation  of a  schedule  of  specific
changes in domestic and trade policies, regular review procedures, and a means
to negotiate adjustments in commitments.  It will be necessary to develop unique,
effective  arrangements  for  the  submission  of Country  Plans,  surveillance  of
undertakings, notification of policy changes and the settling of disputes.  Some of
these arrangements  may be temporary and designed to operate  in the medium
term, pending  the adoption of permanent rules and procedures  for agriculture.
Others will be developed for specific application to domestic agricultural policies
and may  be continued within  the GATT framework.  For example,  empirical
measurements  which  monitor  overall policy  developments  would  be  useful,
whether or not AMS reductions are continued in the longer term. Ifa senior policy
group is established to oversee the AMS approach, the group shouldbe maintained
in order  to provide on-going review and assistance in settling disputes.  These
arrangements  should be integrated into the overall framework in order to give the
GATT a wider role in policy coordination.
The key to the long-term success of the comprehensive approach  lies in the
establishment of a permanent  framework of rules and disciplines  which apply
fully  to  agriculture.  While  governments  may  be  able  to  remove  the  trade-
distorting effects ofcurrentpolicies through a process of progressive adjustments
supported  by  interim  arrangements,  long-term  success  requires  an  agreed
framework of clear and enforceable rules to prevent the re-emergence of trade-
distorting  policies.  Governments  must  be  dissuaded  from  exporting  their
agriculturaladjustmentproblems  to their trading partners by an effective multilateral
system of rules and penalties.
25The permanent framework of GATT rules should remove all exceptions for
agriculture that arise from waivers, grandfather clauses and protocols of accession
and should capture all policies currently outside GATI'disciplines. The prohibition
in Article XI on the use of quantitative restrictions should explicitly include all
QRs and similar border restrictions such as variable levies, minimum import price
regimes and voluntary restraint agreements.  Some  may be converted  to tariff
equivalent forms and bound.  If any remain, strict conditions for their continuance
should be negotiated, including bound minimum access commitments, phaseout
periods and procedures  for regular review.
Similarly,  rules relating  to  subsidies  should  be  revised  to  apply  fully  to
agricultural  products.  There  should  be  a  prohibition  of  agricultural  export
subsidies and other subsidies with equivalent effects.  The disciplines  of Articles
XI and XVI should either be extended to cover state trading operations, or Article
XVII should be altered to ensure that state trading enterprises are subject to the
disciplines relating to import restrictions and export subsidies.  The requirements
for transparency of state  trading operations  need  to be strengthened.  Finally,
agreements on harmonizing standards and sanitary and phytosanitary  measures
should be fully implemented.
The  enforcement  of specific  commitments  under  the strengthened  rules,
whether of an interim or permanent nature, should be achieved through the regular
provisions of Articles  XXII and XXIII covering consultation,  nullification,  or
impairment.  However,  stronger surveillance and dispute settlement procedures
will be necessary.  The dispute settlement process must function effectively if the
system  is  to survive.  The rules  and disciplines  must  be made  effective  and
operational, and the dispute settlement procedures  must operate in a manner that
is expeditious, transparent and fair. Finally, there will be agreements reached in
other negotiating groups in the Uruguay Round which are important to agriculture.
Steps should be taken to ensure the full application of the general results of the
Round to agriculture.
Following a  period of  adjustment in national policies and the implementation
of stronger  and more  effective  rules, it  may  be useful  to review  the  various
multilateral mechanisms that could be used to improve stability in international
markets. In the past, international commodity agreements and GATT commodity
codes have not  been effective, largely because they could not deal adequately with
the underlying causes of trade problems.  In the new trading environment, there
may be workable mechanisms that could reduce market fluctuations caused by
unexpected  natural  developments,  unusual  price  fluctuations,  exchange  rate
misalignments and other general economic  factors.  Open trading arrangements
should contribute  to international  price  and exchange  rate  stability  but many
countries, particularly in the developing world, will seek additional arrangements
to buffer their internal markets against extreme price fluctuations.
26Conclusions
*  The Uruguay  Round  for agriculture  is different  from  previous  negotiating
rounds.  For the first time,  governments  have acknowledged  that domestic
policies are the fundamental cause of agricultural trade problems.
*  The negotiations are currently stalled because of differences  in the degree to
which  countries  are willing to  reform  their agricultural  policies,  differing
opinions on which countries are responsible for agricultural trade problems,
and philosophical  differences on  the degree to which  market forces  should
operate.
*  A comprehensive negotiating framework based on the following principles is
required:
1.  The objectives  of the negotiations  are  to  freeze,  gradually  reduce,  and
finally eliminate the trade-distorting effects of agricultural policies.
2.  While  countries  should  remain  free  to  choose  their  own  agricultural
policies, governments should reach an early agreement on those policies
which have a minimal impact on trade, and are deemed acceptable.
3.  Reform of agricultural policies in developing countries should be included
in the negotiations, but an agreement on agricultural policy reform needs
to take into account their level of economic development.
4.  All policies that distort agricultural trade should be subject to clear, precise
and  enforceable  GATT rules  and disciplines.  These  rules  should  be
broadly consistent with those for other traded products.
*  The  Comprehensive  Framework  proposed  in  this  report  consists  of  three
parallel approaches:
1.  Use  of  an  across-the-board  negotiating  technique  and  Country  Plans
which  identify  the  mechanisms  by  which  countries  will reduce  trade-
distorting assistance to agriculture.
2.  The progressive implementation  of GATT rules and disciplines.
3.  The adoption  of ad hoc  commodity  and/or policy  specific agreements
where necessary.
*  The basic list of policies "Subject to Negotiation" consists of border measures,
price/income  supports, and input subsidies.  Decoupled income payments and
price/income stabilization programs can be excluded from negotiation if they
meet conditions agreed to by the Contracting Parties. Other policies would be
monitored and could be subject to ad hoc negotiation.
27*  Negotiations under the Comprehensive Framework should lead to actions and
commitments to be undertaken in the short, medium  and long term.
*  Short-term  objectives are to relieve the pressure of surpluses on international
markets and to  move the negotiations  forward  through a demonstration  of
"good intent".  Short-term actions are to:
1.  Freeze indirect  and direct export subsidies,  the  trade effects of supply
control programs, and quantitative restrictions.
2.  Responsibly  manage and release  stocks.
3.  Agree to a major reduction in trade-distorting levels of support over the
medium  term.
4.  Negotiate a package of immediate reductions in the trade-distorting level
of support, equivalent to at least 10 percent.
*  The medium-term objective is to achieve a significant reduction in the trade-
distorting effects of government policies.  Medium-term  actions are to:
1.  Reduce the trade-distorting level of support in all countries by fifty percent
over a five year period.
2.  Progressively bring agriculture under  GATI rules and disciplines.
*  The long-term objective is to bring agriculture  fully within  an improved and
properly functioning trading system.  Long-term actions are to:
1.  Complete the process of reducing the barriers to trade and the removal of
trade-distorting subsidies.
2.  Encourage the adjustment of domestic farm programs to remove or limit
their adverse effects on trade.
3.  Implement and maintain an open trading system for agriculture based on
a  permanent  framework  of  clear  and  enforceable  GAT'  rules  and
disciplines.
*  The  mid-term review  in Montreal  will be a critical  point for  the Uruguay
Round.  Success of the Round hinges on the political resolve to follow through
on the Punta del Este Declaration.  An agreement to adopt a Comprehensive
Framework,  such as the above, would be a major step forward along the path
towards  an improved trading system for agriculture.
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